

## MEMORANDUM

5-21 April 1971

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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April 19, 1971

## MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS  
APPLY

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Ambassador Michalowski Wednesday,  
April 21

The Ambassador has returned from home leave and consultations. He had tried to see you before he left. I am not sure what exactly he wants. As you know he is a slick operator, having survived through the Stalinist, Gomulka and now the Gierek regimes. However, he may be in some trouble. 25X1

1. He may reopen the question of the catalytic cracking process (an \$8 million process to be sold by an Illinois firm). Our decision to turn it down last November was a setback for Michalowski, who had lobbied for it and enlisted the aid of Congressman Zablocki. The negative decision, however, left open the possibility of reopening it later.

Jan Kaczmarek, Chairman of the Polish Science and Technology Committee, who is coming here this month to visit with Ed David, mentioned continuing interest in obtaining the process. Michalowski may hope for a favorable signal before Kaczmarek arrives.

State Dept. review completed

If he raises it you might say

-- naturally, if a formal request is renewed by the Chicago firm, and the Polish Government is still interested, we would review the case.

-- what reason would the Ambassador cite for a favorable decision now compared to last November? (He will now argue that we should have a positive interest in helping the new government, and promoting stability in Eastern Europe.)

NOTE: If he does not mention it, there is no reason for you to take the initiative. (Defense is strongly opposed to the whole project.)

2. Conference on European Security. Even under Gierek, the Poles remain active agitators for a European Conference; their latest scheme is for several

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conferences on the grounds that there is so much to discuss. He may ask about the Berlin talks and argue that they should not be a strict precondition. He might say that if Berlin is stalemated, a grand conference might improve the atmosphere for a Berlin settlement.

You might say

-- if Berlin cannot be settled, what meaning would a conference have that avoided all the difficult questions;

-- even if there were a Berlin settlement, it is difficult to see what would be an acceptable agenda for a conference; MBFR is the only subject of conceivable interest, and a conference of all Europeans is not necessary for this;

-- the Poles would do well to use their influence on Ulbricht and the Soviets to settle Berlin, rather than promoting a meaningless conference.

3. The Polish Internal Scene. You might ask in what way Gierek's foreign policy will differ from Gomulka's.

4. The Poles are complaining on the one hand that we are obstructing the ratification of the Polish-German treaty, but on the other hand, they have indicated to Bonn they do not wish it ratified before the Soviet treaty. If Michalowski raises this with you again, you might wish to comment

-- we expressed our "satisfaction" with the treaty at the time of its signing, and you have said on many occasions we support a German-Polish reconciliation;

-- the West Germans linked the treaties to the Berlin negotiations, not the United States, but we abide by their desires;

-- the ratification issue and linkage is a highly charged issue inside West Germany, and we do not wish to inject ourselves in domestic politics;

-- together with the Allies we will consider an appropriate statement on the occasion of the ratification of the German-Polish treaty.

5. Vietnam. It is not certain whether Michalowski will want to talk about Vietnam. His Charge, Frackiewicz, has been going around town saying that the Poles were evaluating their position on negotiations.

-- He told Sullivan that Warsaw was engaged in an evaluation of diplomatic prospects on the Indochina front and that this evaluation was

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associated with meetings which senior Poles would be having with the North Vietnamese during the Soviet Congress. Sullivan said current prospects in Paris look very bleak.

-- He asked Dick Smyser whether there was any prospects for getting the negotiations revived, and asked why we did not accept Hanoi's position. Smyser told him the next step was up to the North Vietnamese and that we certainly would not accept the preconditions which had been set.

Our Embassy in Warsaw thinks that Frackiewicz was acting on his own in his conversations here. Michalowski told our Ambassador in Warsaw that he had no special plans to see North Vietnamese in Warsaw and was unaware of any policy review.

With this background, Michalowski may not have much to say. We doubt that he will want to launch into discussions leading to Polish involvement in the negotiations.

In any case, we do not want the Poles involved, and I see no reason for you to say anything to Michalowski except that we find Hanoi's preconditions unacceptable.

WH:mm

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